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THE INTERESTS OF "PEOPLES" IN THE
COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF SACRED SITES

Kristen A. Carpenter*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much has been written about "cooperation" in the management of federal public
lands. Scholars have considered, for example, "cooperative federalism" as a theoretical
and doctrinal basis for involving tribal, state, local, and other entities in the management
of federal public lands.' Others have looked at the practical challenges presented by
various models of cooperative management. 2 As scholars have suggested, the issue of
cooperation has important implications for American Indian interests on the public
3
lands.
This essay looks at the question of cooperation in the context of American Indian
sacred sites located on federal public lands. For many American Indians, these sites are
integral to their religious and cultural practices, as well as political and community
vitality. Thus, many American Indians feel that it is important to maintain an
atmosphere of quiet reverence appropriate for ceremonial activities and to protect the
physical integrity of sacred sites from desecration. Yet, these sites are located on public

* Assistant Professor, University of Denver, College of Law; J.D., Harvard Law School (1998); A.B.,
Dartmouth College (1994). This essay was prepared as a presentation for the Panel on Cooperative
Management of Tribal Natural Resources, a joint program of the section on Natural Resources and Indian
Nations and Indigenous Peoples, AALS Annual Meeting, January, 2007.
1. See generally Robert D. Comer, Cooperative Federalism: The Federalism Underpinnings to Public
Involvement in the Management of Public Lands, 75 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1133 (2004); Robert L. Fischman,
Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resource Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 179 (2005); see also Robert B.
Keiter, PublicLands and Law Reform: Putting Theory, Policy, and Practicein Perspective,2005 Utah L. Rev.
1127, 1173-80 (on constituency-based governance).
2. See e.g. Hope M. Babcock, Dual Regulation, CollaborativeManagement, or Layered Federalism. Can
CooperativeFederalismModels from Other Laws Save Our Public Lands? 3 Hastings W.-N.W. J. Envtl. L. &
Policy 193, 203-05 (1996); see generally Allyson Barker et al., Student Authors, The Role of Collaborative
Groups in FederalLand and Resource Management: A Legal Analysis, 23 J. Land, Resources, & Envtl. L. 67
(2003).
3. See e.g. Erin Patrick Lyons, "Give Me a Home Where the Buffalo Roam ": The Case in Favor of the
Management-FunctionTransfer of the National Bison Range to the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the FlatheadNation, 8 J. Gender, Race & Just. 711 (2005); Rebecca Tsosie, The Conflict between the
"Public Trust" and "Indian Trust" Doctrines: Federal Public Land Policy and Native Nations, 39 Tulsa L.
Rev. 271, 297 (2003). Beyond the public lands and sacred sites, the notion of cooperation has ramifications for
many issues of Indian concern including governance and economic development. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher,
Reviving Local Tribal Control in Indian Country, 53 Fed. Law. 38 (Mar.-Apr. 2006) (available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=879808 (accessed Sept. 15, 2006)); Lorie M. Graham, An InterdisciplinaryApproach
to American Indian Economic Development, 80 N.D. L. Rev. 598 (2005).
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lands where non-Indians engage in recreation, extractive industries, or their own
religious use. These competing uses create challenges for the federal agencies entrusted
with managing the public lands on behalf of all American people.
Changes in the administrative process have certainly improved sacred sites
management over the past decade. 4 Statutes, executive orders, agency regulations, and
guidelines provide Indian tribes and other affected groups and individuals with
significant opportunities to participate in the development of federal management plans,
particularly through consultation processes. 5 Federal agencies demonstrate increasing
awareness of the many issues involved in sacred sites accommodations. 6 More often
than not, citizens comply with management plans that have special provisions
recognizing Indian needs at sacred sites. 7 Yet problems remain. Land management
plans offering even modest accommodations of American Indian religious uses are
fiercely contested in court, 8 and some people continue to express bitterness about these
accommodations. 9 In short, the management of sacred sites located on federal public
0
lands continues to be highly contentious.l
Part of the problem seems to be that, despite the recent changes, a number of
11
groups feel their interests are still marginalized in federal sacred sites management.
Indian tribes, local citizens' groups, far-away citizens' groups, and others are sometimes
unsatisfied with both the process and substance of federal accommodations. In the
ensuing battles, members of these groups start to accentuate their differences and deny
the legitimacy of competing claims to sacred sites. 12 Often times, conversations about

4. See Marcia Yablon, Student Author, PropertyRights and Sacred Sites: FederalRegulatory Responses
to American Indian Religious Claimson Public Land, 113 Yale L.J. 1623, 1638-58 (2004).
5. See id
6. Review infra note 111 on guidelines about Indian sacred sites published by the U.S. Forest Service,
National Park Service, and Department of Defense.
7. At Devils Tower National Monument, for example, compliance with the National Park Service's Final
Climbing Management Plan "has been roughly 85%, meaning the number of people climbing in June since the
voluntary ban was implemented in 1996 is 85% less than the number of people who climbed in June 1995."
George Linge, Student Author, Ensuring the FullFreedom of Religion on PublicLands: Devils Tower and the
ProtectionofIndian Sacred Sites, 27 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 307, 331 n. 45 (2000).
8 See e.g. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assn. v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999) (challenging
management plan that asks rock climbers to refrain from climbing on Devil's Tower in the month of June);
Natural Arch & Bridge Socy. v. Alston, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2002) (challenging management plan
that asks tourists to walk around rather than under Rainbow Bridge).
9. For a sense of various attitudes held by people at and around several sacred sites, review In the Light of
Reverence (Bullfrog Films 2002) (conducting interviews with individuals on all sides of sacred sites disputes)
(transcr. available at http://www.sacredland.org/ ITLOR_pages/transcript.html (accessed Jan. 19, 2007)).
10. See Kristen A. Carpenter, A Property Rights Approach to Sacred Sites Cases: Asserting a Place for
Indians as Nonowners, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 1061, 1069-85 (2005) (on litigation involving sacred sites).
11. See e.g. William Perry Pendley, The Establishment Clause and the Closure of "'Sacred"Public and
Private Lands, 83 Deny. U. L. Rev. 1023, 1024 (2006) (criticizing management planning process at the
Medicine Wheel in Big Horn National Forest, Wyoming, as not involving any members of the private sector).
12. See In the Light of Reverence, supra n. 9. Winnie Bush, the mayor of Hulett, Wyoming, provides an
example:
Our culture is as important as the Indian culture and we people who have lived here all our lives, we
have our own culture that is being invaded by the Indians coming here all the time and taking over.

[A]II the prayer bundles at Devils Tower to me is offensive .... They have all the rest of the United
States to hang 'em in. Why do they have to hang 'em at Devils Tower?
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rights at sacred sites devolve into mudslinging and only serve to polarize groups and
13
diminish chances for cooperation in the planning process.
This essay contends that there is a structural element of federal law and policy that,
unfortunately, sets up these battles over sacred sites. The Supreme Court has held that
whatever rights groups may have at sacred sites, the federal government's rights as
owner and sovereign of the public lands ultimately prevails. 14 Federal agencies can, if
they choose, accommodate various interests on the public lands, but such decisions are
left to fluctuating executive policy and the discretion of land managers. 1 5 This approach
reflects well-established doctrine in public lands law, 16 but leaves various citizens and
groups clamoring for the federal government to recognize their interests and battling one
another in the process.
To foster a more cooperative approach to sacred sites management, it may help to
transcend the model of absolute federal control with various groups left fighting over the
crumbs of accommodation. 17 Instead, federal land management should recognize the
concerns of groups on all sides of sacred sites disputes, make those concerns an explicit
part of legal analysis, and develop models to recognize the various interests at stake. Of
course, it will be immensely challenging to reform the management of sacred sites in
these ways, and this essay aims only to offer some preliminary thoughts on the topic.
This essay argues for analysis of sacred sites problems through the language of
"peoples" and "peoplehood." In its plain meaning sense, a people is defined as"a body
of persons that are united by a common culture, tradition, or sense of kinship, that
typically have common language, institutions, and beliefs, and that often constitute a
politically organized group." 18 And peoplehood means the sense or state of belonging to

When I go to Devils Tower, I definitely have a religious experience. I think it's one of the most
awesome sites I've ever seen, and I been looking at it all my life. But it's not like the church. It has
no similarities at all.
Id.
13. For an example of cynical rhetoric, review John Dendahl, Indian Sovereignty Has Outlived Its
Usefulness, Haw. Rptr. (Jan. 26, 2006) (available at http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.
aspx?b052fb7c-bf08-4526-8155-70caddl2dI 51) ("The issue is 'sacred sites,' without access to which [Tesuque
Pueblo Governor] Mitchell claims his tribe's culture and way of life would fade. Never mind that Ski Santa Fe
operators permit access on the mountain to anyone, anywhere, except for skier safety closures. And never
mind that Mitchell's tribe has apparently been able to adjust its culture and way of life to operating a decidedly
nontraditional casino, not miles away up in the mountains but right on the pueblo grounds.").
14. See Lyng v. N. W.Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 453 (1988) ("Whatever rights the
Indians may have to the use of the area,. . . those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what
is, after all, its land.")
15. Id.at 453-54 ("Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the
religious needs of any citizen. The Government's rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and
should not discourage it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian
respondents.").
16. See Carpenter, supra n. 10 at 1120-21 (discussing the legal basis for, and scope of, federal authority
over the public lands).
17. See Howard J. Vogel, The Clash of Stories at Chimney Rock: A Narrative Approach to Cultural
Conflict over Native American Sacred Sites on Public Land, 41 Santa Clara L. Rev. 757 (2001) (characterizing
sacred sites disputes as cultural conflicts and advocating a narrative approach that would stimulate new ways of
resolving sacred sites disputes).
18. Merriam-Webster'sCollegiate Dictionary860 (10th ed. Merriam-Webster 1993).
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a people. 19 The concept of peoplehood thus helps to explain and validate why human
beings group themselves in certain ways and why certain things may be important to
them. 20 In the sacred sites context, peoplehood has at least two important ramifications:
(1) it can expand the discussion beyond the power of the federal government to include
the interests of subnational groups, and (2) it can inspire those groups to recognize and
accept one another's interests. 2 1 Thus, considering the interests of peoples might lay the
groundwork for an attitude of cooperation at sacred sites.
I should say at the outset that recognizing varied groups as peoples does not mean
they will all have the same needs or equal entitlements at sacred sites. Advocates for
Indian tribes may, in particular, fear that peoplehood models ignore tribes' special claims
to sovereignty or reduce tribes to mere stakeholders along with everyone else who ever
drove an RV into a national park. 22 This is certainly not the aim of my argument.
Rather, once all peoples with legitimate interests in sacred sites are identified and
included in the management process, then they should have an opportunity to discuss
their different rights and needs at sacred sites. Tribal sovereignty-along with federal
and state sovereignty and the status of local governments-will be a baseline for the
discussion. When it comes to specific needs, tribes may raise religious and cultural
practices, while non-Indian peoples might articulate economic, recreational, and their
own religious needs. Any discussion of peoplehood interests should take into account
the differing political rights and the substantive needs of different peoples.
Part II of this essay describes peoplehood concerns in current sacred sites disputes,
pointing out that these concerns are prevalent among many groups but silenced in the
legal discourse. Part III introduces several scholarly definitions of peoples and
peoplehood that may serve to explicate collective concerns at sacred sites. Part IV
considers what peoplehood brings to the sacred sites conversation, as well as potential
critiques of this approach. Part V suggests additional areas for research and study related
to peoplehood concerns at sacred sites.
II.

PEOPLES AT SACRED SITES

In January 2006, a federal district court rejected efforts of the Navajo Nation and
other tribes to challenge the expansion of skiing and implementation of snowmaking at
the Arizona Snowbowl. 23 The tribes claimed, in particular, that the Snowbowl's plan to
use reclaimed water in the snowmaking operations would desecrate the San Francisco
24
Peaks, where the ski area is located, a place of religious significance to the Navajos.
The federal district court held that the snowmaking plan, as approved by the United
25
States Forest Service, did not violate any relevant statutes on religious freedom,

19. Id.
20. E.g. Nell Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,41 Am. Univ. L. Rev. 753, 776, 779,
781 & n. 142 (1992) (on the "right to exist as a tribe" as implicating issues of peoplehood).
2 1. See Kristen A. Carpenter, Old Ground and New Directions at Sacred Sites on the Western Landscape,
83 Deny. U. L. Rev. 981, 1000 (2006) (on non-Indian interests on the public lands).
22. See Tsosie, supra n. 3, at 292, 300.
23. Navajo Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 408 F. Supp. 2d 866 (D. Ariz. 2006).
24. Id. at 870, 887-89.
25. Id. at 905-06.
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national historic preservation, 26 environmental protection, 27 or administrative
procedure. 28 The court also found the plan satisfied requirements of the federal
government's trust duty to tribes. 29 For all of these reasons,30the district court granted
summary judgment to the Forest Service and other defendants.
The Snowbowl decision is, as a legal opinion, completely unremarkable. It
follows a long line of precedents denying Indian tribes relief against federal land use
management practices that interfere with the tribes' ability to use public lands for
religious and cultural practices. 3 1 For the tribal plaintiffs and surrounding community
members, however, the case invoked deeply held sentiments. Navajo President Joe
Shirley, Jr., decried the outcome: "It is another sad day... [when] in the 21st Century,
genocide and religious persecution continue to be perpetrated on Navajo people, other
Native Americans living in the states of Arizona and New Mexico, who regard the Peaks
32
as sacred."
Tesuque Pueblo Governor Mark Mitchell was reported to have said, "[my]
people have lived through natural and human-created disasters, and now with a stroke of
a pen the future of a people is at risk."'33 Coconino County Supervisor Louise
Yellowman echoed the feelings of injustice and outrage, asserting: "[t]he Native
Americans are forgotten people in the United States including the veterans who
sacrificed their lives and everything they had to protect this country and liberty for
freedom of the United States. And yet our Native American vets are not treated with
34
respect."
On the other side, the case prompted the former chair of the New Mexico
Republican Party and gubernatorial candidate, John Dendahl, 35 to issue an opinion piece
using the Snowbowl case as support for his claim that "Indian sovereignty has outlived
its usefulness." 36 Professing skepticism about the sincerity of the Indians' religious
interest in the San Francisco Peaks, 3 7 Dendahl further argued that Indian claims,
religious and otherwise, threaten to divide the American people:
Why do Indians have any standing whatsoever to deny on religious grounds others' use of
public lands when public practice of religion by the rest of us is thoroughly circumscribed?

26. Id. at 878-80.
27. Id. at 872-78, 881-82.
28. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 908.

29. Id at 882.
30. Id. at 908.

The tribes appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the court heard oral

arguments in September 2006.
31. E.g. Lyng, 485 U.S. 439.
32. Cyndy Cole, Snowmaking Opponents Now Targeting City Council, Ariz. Daily Sun (Jan. 13, 2006)

(available at http://www.azdailysun.com/articles/2006/01/13/import-I 22920.prt).
33. Dendahl, supra n. 13 (citation omitted).
34. Cole, supra n. 32.

35. On November 7, 2006, Dendahl lost the gubernatorial race to Bill Richardson. When Dendahl wrote
his opinion piece, he indicated he had been "chairman of the Republican Party of New Mexico for more than
eight years." Dendahl, supra n. 13.
36. Id.
37. Id. ("I am deeply skeptical of [the Indians' claim]. I have enjoyed Ski Santa Fe since its first, rustic
year of operation and can find no one who has ever seen an Indian anywhere in the ski area vicinity seeking
spiritual nourishment other than what we all enjoy from recreation there.").
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(Answer: according to a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court decision in a similar case, they do not.)

Add to that the overwhelming list of evidence that the Indians' status as wards of the
federal government, but "sovereign" as against the states, is not in anyone's best interests.
[The legal status of Indians is] just flat backward. This is a time for making rational what
it means to be American, not playing footsie with those who seek national weakness
through divisive schemes leading straight toward Balkanization.
There is no time better than the present to commence an earnest discussion as to how we
achieve equal standing among
all American citizens, none superior, none inferior, and all
38
celebrated as individuals.
The rhetoric from the Indian and non-Indian sides of this case, though seemingly
so disparate, actually agrees on one thing: sacred sites cases evoke strong feelings about
our existences as peoples. Navajo President Shirley uses the language of "genocide,"
articulating the idea that spraying reclaimed water on a sacred site threatens the ability of
Navajos to exist as Navajos. Tesuque Pueblo Governor Mitchell worries that "the future
of a people is at risk." County Supervisor Yellowman queries why Navajos have
sacrificed their lives in world wars only to be denied a basic freedom guaranteed to "the
American people"--the right to worship freely.
Dendahl claims to be concerned with Americans' interests as individuals, but he
ultimately sounds just as worried about the fate of the American people. He expresses
the view that Indians do not really need special access to sacred sites to survive, and if
they do, then perhaps it is time to stop allowing them to exist as sovereign peoples within
the larger American citizenry. After all, Indian peoplehood may limit non-Indian
citizens' use of public lands-an equal right of access that seems integral to their
American citizenship-and may even fractionate Americans.
But while the interests of peoples resonate throughout sacred sites disputes like the
Snowbowl case, these interests remain the legal elephant in the room. The United States
legal system, with its focus on individual rights, does not often recognize the claims of
collective peoples. 39 Indian tribes are usually somewhat of an exception to this
observation, of course. Federal treaties, statutes, judicial decisions, and administrative
rulings regularly recognize rights of Indian nations as collective entities that maintain a
relationship with the United States on a government-to-government basis.
Yet for all
of its recognition of tribal rights, the body of federal Indian law has not protected the
41
collective interests of tribes in sacred sites cases.

38. Id. (parenthetical added).
39. See generally Aviam Soifer, Law and the Company We Keep (Harv. U. Press 1995).
40. Gloria Valencia-Weber, Racial Equality: Old and New Strains and American Indians, 80 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 333, 374 (2004) (on Title 25 of the United States Code as a body of law uniquely pertaining to Indians
in their "personal and collective lives"); see also Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to
Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 175, 207-14 (2000). Riley
discusses "Native Americans' unique right to communal property and collective ownership." Id. at 206.
41. See generally Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century
ChristianizationPolicy in Twentieth-Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 773
(1997).
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Non-Indian religious communities, citizens of local towns, and recreation groups
complain that they too are disenfranchised in federal sacred sites cases. 42 The current
practice of federal administrative agencies is to consult with affected individuals and
groups before announcing management plans for sacred sites located on public lands.
While such administrative policy has resulted in the accommodation of multiple user
groups on the public lands-for example, Lakota religious practitioners and non-Indian
climbers at Devils Tower, Wyoming-a number of problems persist. Some stakeholders
critique federal consultation at both the process and substance levels, complaining it
disadvantages certain groups and results in unsatisfactory management of public lands.
Indian participants sometimes find the federal processes to be culturally foreign,
particularly when it comes to discussing the sensitive topic of religion. 4 3 They may not
feel inclined, or permitted by their religious beliefs, to submit written comments or voice
public statements about their ceremonial practices. 44 Moreover, tribes may lack the
financial or administrative resources to participate in formal consultation processes.
When Indian tribes and individuals do surmount these challenges and participate in
federal consultations, they sometimes find that the government ends up disregarding
their opinions. But non-Indian citizens claim that the administrative process actually
bends over backwards to foster Indian participation
and ultimately results in substantive
45
decisions that prefer Indians over non-Indians.
These concerns manifest in a number of sacred sites disputes. In the Snowbowl
case, for example, the Forest Service pointed out that it did consult with affected Indian
tribes but ultimately used its administrative discretion to pursue the ski area expansion
and snowmaking plan anyway. 46 Similarly, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, in which the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the federal
government to destroy sacred sites, 47 the Forest Service had been aware of Indian
concerns about a proposed development project. 48 The Forest Service engaged experts
to conduct a study, including interviews with Indian elders, to assess the impacts of the
proposed project on the tribal religious and cultural practices. 49 This study found that
the project would "produce an irreparable impact" on the Indian religion and
50
recommended avoiding sacred places in the construction of a road and timber project.

42. See generally Pendley, supra n. 11.
43. See generally Sarah Palmer, Cherie Shanteau & Deborah Osborne, Strategiesfor Addressing Native
TraditionalCulturalProperties,20 Nat. Res. & Env. 45 (Fall 2005).
44. See Kristen A. Carpenter, ConsideringIndividual Religious Freedoms under Tribal ConstitutionalLaw,
14 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 561, 563 (Spring 2005).
45. See Pendley, supra n. 11, at 1024-25.
46. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 879 n. II ("Throughout the tribal consultation process, the Forest
Service made over 200 phone calls, held 41 meetings, and exchanged 245 letters with tribal representatives.
Although the consultation process did not end with a decision the tribal leaders supported, this does not mean
that the Forest Service's consultation process was substantively and procedurally inadequate.").
47. 485 U.S. at 441-42.
48. Id. at 442
49. Id.
50. N. W. Cemetery Protection Assn. v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986); see Lyng, 485 U.S. at
442. The court concluded that the road and timber project would "virtually destroy... the Indians' ability to
practice their religion." 795 F.2d at 693; see Lyng, 485 U.S. at 467 (Brennan, Marshall, & Blackmun JJ.,
dissenting).
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But the Forest Service rejected the recommendation and decided to go ahead with the
project. 5 1 In both cases, the Forest Service decided to avoid certain particular sensitive
areas, such as shrines, but still elected to pursue larger development projects that would,
in the tribes' view, harm Indian religious practices. When their input can be
substantially disregarded, tribes may wonder if an opportunity to consult or otherwise
participate in federal decision-making processes can actually protect their religious and
52
cultural needs.
The facts of the infamous Devils Tower case reveal dissatisfaction among groups
on various sides of the federal consultation and accommodation process. Non-Indian
residents of towns bordering the monument complain that accommodating Indian
religious practices harms the local economy by discouraging tourists from visiting the
area. 53 They also question the extent of Indian history and religious practice at Devils
Tower. 54 Rock climbers argue that a voluntary climbing ban interferes with their
recreational and commercial uses of the Tower. 55 When these non-Indians try to
56
challenge federal accommodations in court, they are denied standing to sue.
Indians, on the other hand, are supposed to be content with federal
accommodations that offer only very modest protection for their religious practices: the
centerpiece of the much-contested Final Climbing Management Plan at Devils Tower is
a mere request that rock climbers voluntarily restrict their climbing during the month of
June. 57 By contrast, the federal courts have permitted Christian denominations to
58
exclude the public completely from their religious events, for short periods of time.
59
Rock climbing is banned altogether on national monuments such as Mount Rushmore
60
which is also closed on Christmas Day.
The above discussion begins to suggest some groups' dissatisfaction with federal
sacred sites law and policy. Yet, there is other data showing substantial compliance with
at least some federal management plans, 6 1 and, without extensive empirical work, it is
difficult to state conclusively whether accommodation of multiple users at sacred sites
has been largely successful or not-or even to define what "success" would mean in this
context. Yet, it seems reasonable to conclude that some groups feel their issues are not

51. Id. at443.
52 Compare Yablon, supra n. 4, at 1646 (on the "effectiveness" of statutory consultation provisions in the
sacred sites realm).
53. See In the Light of Reverence, supra n. 9 ("Recreation is one of the top five income generators in every
western state. It's very, very important. But what we also see is the potential that mining activity, oil and gas
activity, or timber harvesting, or ranching or water development, or these other activities that are very
important economically, could also be stopped as a result of, 'Well, somebody thinks it's sacred, and that's
enough for us."').
54. See id. ("Our family history goes back seven generations in Crook County in the ranching business.
And there really were no Native Americans here-until they were invited by the park service." (quoting
rancher Jesse Driskill)).
55. See BearLodge, 175 F.3d at 821.
56. Id.at 822.
57 Id at 819-20.
58. O'Hairv. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931,937 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
59. See 36 C.F.R. § 7.77(a) (2006) ("Climbing Mount Rushmore is prohibited.").
60 See National Park Service, Mount Rushmore National Memorial, Operating Hours and Seasons,
available at http://www.nps.gov/morui/planyourvisit/hours.htm (accessed Jan. 19, 2007).
61. Review supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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being addressed and that their dissatisfaction impedes opportunities to foster a more
cooperative and less litigious approach to sacred sites management. Toward that end, the
next section discusses how the language of peoplehood may help to explicate the
concerns of groups at sacred sites on the public lands.
III.

NAMING COLLECTIVE CONCERNS: PEOPLEHOOD

In common parlance, the term peoples connotes a collective association of
62
individuals based on political affiliation, religion, culture, language, or other factors.
This broad definition suggests obvious national groups like the American, Iraqi, or
Israeli people. It also includes subnational groups like the Mormon, Orthodox Jewish, or
Navajo people within the United States; the Sunni, Shiite, or Kurdish people in Iraq; and
the Jewish or Arab people in Israel. Peoples may be small groups such as the citizens of
a particular town or the members of a tiny linguistic or religious group. The term
63
peoplehood refers to the state of being a people or the sense of belonging to a people.
It is a sense of peoplehood that prompts people to identify as American or Navajo or
Arab and to comport their lives according to the values and behaviors of those peoples.
Beyond these common meanings of the terms, scholars advance a number of useful
definitions of peoples and peoplehood. Rogers Smith defines "a political people" as a
group that is "a potential adversary of other forms of human association, because its
proponents ... assert that its obligations legitimately trump many of the demands made
on its members in the name of other associations." 64 Under this definition, a people may
be constituted along religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, or other lines. Recognizing that
peoples have varying power and influence over issues of varying breadth and depth,
Smith recognizes the following as examples of peoples: China, the U.S., Belgium, the
Navajos, Puerto Rico, Ecovillages, Quebec, Wales, Antioquia, Brooklyn, Hong Kong,
65
Jehovah's Witnesses, the AFL-CIO, Greenpeace, Oxfam, and PEN.
Though Smith's list of political peoples is obviously very inclusive, he is careful to
point out that some will "advance 'strong' claims to allegiance over a 'wide' range of
issues down to those more politically trivial groups that advance only 'weak' claims to
allegiance over a 'narrow' range of issues." 66 Moreover, some groups or associations
are not peoples at all. The political nature of his model would exclude, for example,
"football clubs, singing groups, and Girl Scout troops." 6 7 Although members might feel
"great loyalty" to such groups, "neither the leaders nor members of such associations are
ever likely to assert seriously that the obligations of those memberships justify them in
68
violating governmental laws."
Ultimately, Smith focuses on the way peoples partake in political life. Peoples

62. Supran. 18.
63. Supran. 19.
64. Rogers M. Smith, Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Membership 20
(Cambridge U. Press 2003); see also John Lie, Modern Peoplehood(Harv. U. Press 2004).
65. Smith, supra n. 64, at 21.
66. Id. at 20.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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articulate "ethically constitutive stories" that seek to define their place in the larger
society. 69 Clashes between peoples can be dangerous, as in incidents of violent ethnic
conflict and racial oppression. But peoples often meet in political forums and their
70
interactions, both conflictual and cooperative, are important to community building.
Thus, peoples can contribute productively to society.
The language of peoples and peoplehood also arises in international human rights
law. S. James Anaya argues that "in a world of increasingly overlapping and integrated
political spheres," the term peoples "should be understood to refer to all those spheres of
community, marked by elements of identity and collective consciousness, within which
people's lives unfold-independently of considerations of historical or postulated
sovereignty., 7 1 Anaya writes with awareness of a major debate at the United Nations
concerning the question of whether indigenous peoples are peoples in the international
law sense, with its attendant right of self-determination. 72 In his view, Indian tribes are
"indigenous peoples" in the following sense:
They are indigenous because their ancestral roots are embedded in the lands in which they
live, or would like to live, much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of
society living on the same lands or in close proximity. Furthermore, they are peoples to the
extent they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of existence
and identity that
73
links them to the communities, tribes, or nations of their ancestral past.

American Indian Studies scholar Tom Holm grounds his definition of peoplehood
specifically in American Indian experiences and perspectives. He identifies four
attributes of peoplehood that have ensured the survival of Indian tribes during periods of
conquest and colonization: (1) maintaining language; (2) understanding place; (3)
74
keeping particular religious ceremonies alive; and (4) perpetuating a sacred history.
Though he does not explicitly include it in his matrix, Holm also writes extensively
about a fifth element essential to American Indian peoplehood: retaining rights as
political sovereigns. 75 These attributes of American Indian peoplehood both explain the
persistence of Indian peoples-against federal programs designed specifically to
eradicate them-and suggest how tribes might continue to survive in the future.
What is striking about these definitions of peoples and peoplehood, coming from
such disparate sources, is how similar they are. Each envisions a group of individuals
united by some combination of political organization or institution, culture, and
relationships. On the other hand, the two definitions of indigenous or Indian peoples
contain an element of physical or geographical place that is missing in both the plain
language and political theorist definitions. Thus, this inexhaustive review leaves open
the question of whether a peoples must have some relationship to land, though it is safe

69. Id.at 64-65.
70. See generally Smith, supra n. 64, at 19-71 (on a "theory of peoplemaking").
71. S. James Anaya, Indigenous Peoples in InternationalLaw 103 (2d ed., Oxford U. Press 2004).
72. Id. at 100-03.
73. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
74. Tom Holm, The Great Confusion in Indian Affairs: Native Americans & Whites in the ProgressiveEra
xiv (U. Tex. Press 2005) (relying on the works of Edward H. Spicer, Pierre Castile and Gilbert Kushner, Robert
K. Thomas, Vine Deloria, Jr., and Keith Basso).
75. Id. at xvii.
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to say that for most Indian peoples this element is an attribute of peoplehood.
Importantly, each definition resists equating peoplehood with "statehood." John
Rawls explains that he uses the term peoples as a deliberate choice "to distinguish [his]
thinking from that about political states as traditionally conceived, with their powers of
sovereignty included in the (positive) international law." 76 Given his very broad goal of
working out principles for the operation of a "just democratic society," Rawls realizes
that limiting his concern to traditional states, with dominion over their people and the
right to wage war, would improperly exclude relevant groups. 77 Moreover, international
law itself is recognizing limitations in the powers of states and the importance of nonstate actors. Therefore, Rawls focuses on peoples and "highlight[s] their moral character
78
and the reasonably just, or decent, nature of their regimes."
Rawls puts his finger on what is most useful about the term peoples: it is both
inclusive and reflective of the way societies really function. Typically, states have
dominated political activity and thinking. But today, other collective entities-ranging
from sub-national political groups to internet marketplaces and corporations-are players
in the world arena. Though states remain powerful, an exclusive focus on them obscures
what is really going on in international and domestic settings. The term peoples, unlike
states, includes numerous entities that have a role to play in contemporary society,
including in sacred sites disputes.
IV.

A.

WHAT Do PEOPLEHOOD MODELS ADD TO THE DISCUSSION?

Framingthe Discussion Meaningfully

The importance of including peoples versus just states or sovereigns in legal and
political matters plays out in the sacred sites context. The Supreme Court has adhered to
the outmoded idea that the federal government is the only party that ultimately matters in
sacred sites analysis because it wields both political sovereignty and property ownership
over the public lands. 79 Therefore, the Court has held that the government can do
whatever it wants with its property-and is largely free to accommodate or ignore the
interests of other groups. While other stakeholders such as Indians, recreationalists, and
local townspeople have clamored for a role in sacred sites management, they have won
tiny accommodations of process and substance only at the discretion of the government.
As the opening anecdotes about the Arizona Snowbowl case suggest, however, an
exclusive focus on the government's rights at sacred sites leaves out the interests of
many deeply affected parties, both individuals and groups. Individuals have a whole
slew of claims that they might bring in sacred sites cases-free exercise, establishment
clause, association, speech, and equal protection to name just a few. But collective
entities have fewer claims that might allow them to participate in sacred sites cases. By

76. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples 25 (Harv. U. Press 1999).
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id. at 27.
79. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453 ("Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of [the sacred site] ....
those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land.").
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re-conceptualizing sacred sites disputes in terms of the interests of peoples, perhaps we
can work toward a more inclusive approach to these disputes. The goal should be to
allow meaningful participation by all peoples that can demonstrate some legitimate
80
interest in any particular sacred site.
How might such an approach function in the Snowbowl case, for example?
Ideally, at the outset, the Forest Service would try to gather representatives of all of the
peoples with stakes in the outcome. These might include tribal officials and religious
leaders, representatives of local non-Indians whose livelihoods depend on the Snowbowl,
and spokespersons for the American people's interests in Coconino National Forest
lands. Perhaps there would be other groups represented as well.
With all of the legitimately invested peoples at the table, the Forest Service might
frame its analysis as follows: What are the needs of the various affected peoples at San
Francisco Peaks? Can a management decision be made that recognizes all of their
peoplehood concerns? If not, how should the competing claims among peoples to the
public lands be prioritized? Would it be possible to engage the affected peoples in a
cooperative conversation or even a co-management model?
This approach would differ in some respects from what actually happened in the
case. To some extent, the interests of groups were considered as the Forest Service
evaluated the ski area development and snowmaking plan. The Forest Service undertook
"an extensive environmental review under [the National Environmental Protection Act]
that spanned several years of public participation, tribal consultation and input, and
analysis. ' 8 1 It also engaged in consultation with tribes as mandated under the National
Historic Preservation Act. 82 But it does not appear that each group's needs as peoples
formed an explicit part of the analysis. Rather,
[t]he Forest Service identified the overall purpose and need for the [snowmaking] project
as follows: (1) to ensure a consistent and reliable operating season, thereby maintaining the
economic viability of the Snowbowl and stabilizing employment levels and winter tourism
within the local community; and (2) to improve safety, skiing conditions, and recreational
83
opportunities, bringing terrain and infrastructure into balance with current use levels.
The Forest Service thus seems to have asked: "Can we approve these upgrades to the ski
resort?" and not, "How can we manage these lands in a way that responds to the needs of
various peoples with an interest in this place?"
Interestingly the Forest Service's statement of "purpose" alludes to some group
interests; for example, it references the "the local community" and its economic and
employment needs and also alludes to skiers and tourists. There is, however, no mention
of the various Indian peoples or their interests in San Francisco Peaks. Even though they
had an opportunity to consult on the management plan, Indian tribes and their needs do

80. See Joseph William Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of Property 91 (Yale U. Press 2000)
(advancing an entitlement model of property law whose focus "shifts from identifying the owner to identifying
the conflicting rights of everyone with legitimate claims to rights in the property in question").
81. Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870.
82. Id. at 878-80 ("Throughout the tribal consultation process, the Forest Service made over 200 phone
calls, held 41 meetings, and exchanged 245 letters with tribal representatives.").
83. Id. at 873.
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not seem to have been a primary consideration in the planning or evaluation process.
Thus it should have come as no surprise that six Indian tribes sued to challenge the
84
Forest Service's plan.
Including affected peoples in a more meaningful way in the planning process
might have helped to legitimize the Forest Service's decision about the Snowbowl
development and reduced the legal challenges to it. For example, explicit attention to
peoplehood concerns could open the door for tribal people to articulate how the
protection of sacred sites truly implicates their survival as peoples. If Holm's model is
helpful to them, they might discuss how sacred sites are important to maintaining and
expressing tribal languages, places, religious ceremonies, sacred histories, and rights as
political sovereigns. 8 5 Or they might choose a different, tribal-specific way of
articulating peoplehood concerns.
The non-Indian local community or communities might also represent themselves
as peoples and articulate their concerns about the Snowbowl in a way that corresponds
with one of the peoplehood models. Perhaps they would discuss how employment at the
Snowbowl allows them to maintain a certain way of life, culture, tradition, or sense of
kinship-in addition to the economic, recreation, and tourism concerns that the Forest
Service appears to have identified already. 86 Depending on the facts, environmental and
recreational groups could also have claims to participate in peoplehood discussions
surrounding the Snowbowl. 87
The Forest Service might not be able to accommodate each group's peoplehood
concerns and would ultimately have to prioritize. Some claims to peoplehood at sacred
sites will be stronger than others. 88 But with peoplehood concerns on the table, land
management plans will have a better chance of reflecting the needs of the various
peoples with a stake in the particular place-and of giving these peoples a sense that
their collective interests were heard.
B.

Responding to Critiques
1.

Sovereignty versus Peoplehood

In the Snowbowl case, where Indian concerns were largely ignored by the Forest
Service and federal court, attention to peoplehood might improve Indians' status in the
decision-making framework. But in other cases, non-Indian groups could use the
language of peoplehood to argue for their own inclusion. To the extent that Indian and
non-Indian groups are then similarly characterized as peoples, tribal advocates may
respond that Indian nations are entitled to a higher stakeholder status in sacred sites
84. Id at 869-70 (plaintiff tribes included the Hopi, Havasupai, Hualapai, Navajo, White Mountain
Apache, and Yavapai Apache).
85. See Holm, supran. 74.
86. See supra n. 18 (quoting dictionary definition of "peoples").
87. Under most of the peoplehood definitions, business organizations such as corporations would not be
included as peoples, yet I acknowledge that entities such as the Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership
may have legitimate interests to consider at sacred sites.
88. See Smith, supra n. 64, at 20 (stating, "the strength of the demands made in their name [and] the
number of issues over which they assert priority").
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disputes than other potentially affected peoples. 89 After all, a basic principle of federal
Indian law is that tribes are sovereigns. 90 The language of peoples is not necessary, they
might argue, because Indian peoplehood is already defined by federal law--tribes are
"domestic dependent nations" 9 1 who enjoy an exclusive political relationship with the
United States. Tribes need not compete with other peoples--especially those with
varying degrees of political, cultural, or institutional identity-for the attention of the
federal government. The government already owes tribes a high duty of attention and
care, embodied in the federal trust relationship obligating the government to protect
Indian assets and resources. These principles of sovereignty should function to assure
Indian rights, particularly at sacred sites where Indian interests are so significant. A new
language of peoplehood might diminish Indians' unique status and increase the number
of groups competing for access. For all of these reasons, the language of peoplehood
may seem not only superfluous but also undesirable to tribal advocates.
I appreciate this critique. It is a principled approach to Indian law problems that
relies on well-established legal doctrines. And I do not want to throw out these
principles merely because they have not often worked to protect Indian religious and
cultural freedoms at sacred sites. Rather, I believe that the special status of Indian
nations and the unique relationship of Indians with their sacred sites should play a
prominent role in decisions about sacred sites management. All of tribes' peoplehood
interests, including political sovereignty, should be recognized at sacred sites. Indeed,
this and other attributes of Indian peoplehood will often give tribes stronger claims at
sacred sites than other affected peoples. 92 But acknowledging differences in political
status and weight of claims at sacred sites does not mean that non-Indians as peoples
should be excluded in the sacred sites conversation.
Even from the perspective of a tribal advocate, I still think the better approach is
broad inclusion of all affected peoples in the sacred sites management process. The
present situation is that tribal viewpoints on sacred sites inspire challenges from all
quarters. Non-Indians who feel left out of the process or unhappy with the outcome
wage lawsuits, challenging just about every single federal land management plan that
accommodates Indian religion. Perhaps anticipating such challenges, federal public land
managers now extend only the smallest accommodations of sacred site usage to tribes in
the hopes that these accommodations survive legal challenges.
Thus the current model provides that federal courts will not disturb "voluntary
accommodations," and these are the type of accommodations that federal agencies are
implementing. But these accommodations offer only modest protections for Indian

89. See Tsosie, supra n. 3, at 292, 300; see generally Wallace Coffey & Rebecca Tsosie, Rethinking the
Tribal Sovereignty Doctrine: CulturalSovereignty and the Collective Futureof Indian Nations, 12 Stan. L. &
Policy Rev. 191 (2001).
90. For recent elucidations of tribal sovereignty as a general matter, see Angela R. Riley, Sovereignty and
Cal. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 2007); Sarah Krakoff, The Virtues and Vices of Sovereignty, 38
Illiberalism,
Conn. L. Rev. 797 (2006). For a discussion of tribal sovereignty as applied in the sacred sites context, review
Tsosie, supra n. 3, at 272, 301-10 (exploring how Indian claims to sacred sites can be based in the tribal
sovereignty framework).
91. Cherokee Nation v. Ga., 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
92. See Smith, supra n. 64, at 20 (discussing the relative strengths of different types of peoples over
different issues).
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religions. In the Devils Tower case, the government asks rock climbers not to climb for
one month out of the year, but they are perfectly free to climb anyway, irrespective of
whether they will disturb Indian religious practices. In the Rainbow Bridge case, tourists
are asked to walk around the arch out of respect for Navajo values, but of course they
can walk under it if they choose. 93 And in the Snowbowl case, the Forest Service
approved the ski area expansion and snowmaking plan as proposed by the Arizona
tribes.9 4
Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership, and rejected alternatives proposed by the
The Forest Service offered minor accommodations to the tribes, such as free use of the
ski lifts and efforts to protect shrines and traditional plants. 9 5 The fact that these were
not responsive to the tribes' main concerns96did not alter the court's decision to uphold
the Forest Service's approval of the project.
I do not want to diminish the importance of these accommodations, given that
some of them represent important progress since the Lyng era, when the federal
Some
government seemed poised to destroy certain sacred sites altogether.
accommodations may genuinely help Indian religious practitioners access and protect
sacred sites, and in that respect, they are valuable. As the Snowbowl case suggests,
however, tribes would like more substantial accommodations in some instances.
Including all affected peoples in the land management process might encourage them to
"buy in" to more extensive accommodations of Indian sacred sites usage. Non-Indian
peoples who feel that sacred sites management plans also address their concerns
hopefully will less likely sue to set aside these plans. In the long run, a comprehensive
peoplehood approach may allow federal land managers to propose substantial sacred
sites accommodations that actually respond to Indian concerns.
Some scholars and advocates will argue that this approach is wrong because it
capitulates to the "actual state of things" (meaning Indian disempowerment) rather than
insisting on legal principle (meaning Indian sovereignty). 97 To some extent they will be

93. Review supra note 8.
94. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 870-71. The tribes
contend that the Forest Service violated [the National Environmental Protection Act] by failing to
consider a reasonable range of alternatives. For example, the Navajo Plaintiffs contend that the
Forest Service should have considered a proposal to close the ski area, a buy-out by the tribes, or an
alternative with reduced snowmaking coverage. In addition, the Havasupai Plaintiffs maintain that
the Forest Service should have considered water trading. In response, the Forest Service states that
it did, in fact, consider many of the alternatives raised by the Plaintiffs, but reasonably eliminated
them from more detailed evaluation because they did not meet the purposes and needs for the
proposed action.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Forest Service did not act unreasonably in rejecting the
various alternatives raised by the Plaintiffs during the project's public scoping process.
Id. at 874-75
95. Id. at 878-80 (listing measures to avoid adverse effects of development project to historic property, as
required under the National Historic Preservation Act).
96. See id. at 879 n. 11. ("Although the consultation process did not end with a decision the tribal leaders
supported, this does not mean that the Forest Service's consultation process was substantively and procedurally
inadequate.").
97. For perspectives on the "actual state of things" in Indian country, review Robert Laurence, Learning to
Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian Nations: An Essay in Reaction to Professor Williams'
Algebra, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 435-37 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., Learning Not to Live with Eurocentric
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right: I am acknowledging that the power of the government and non-Indians requires
Indians to confront other stakeholders on the public lands. As a point of legal realism,
however, the discussion of sacred sites on public lands pertains to a category of property
where tribes have lost sovereignty, at least in the sense of governing authority. I hope, of
course, that some day tribes will be able to reclaim ownership and jurisdiction over such
land, and that, in the meantime, they will be able to assert other rights 9 8 and principles of
cultural sovereignty to protect their interests there. 99 But I also hope that even when
non-Indians are meaningfully included as peoples in the management of public lands,
they can acknowledge that Indian sovereignty-along with specific Indian cultural
traditions and histories-should shape the substance of federal land management plans.
Peoples should be able to articulate the peoplehood concerns that are most meaningful to
them. This idealistic proposition might actually work if Indians are, in turn, willing to
acknowledge whatever is most crucial to non-Indian peoples in the management of
public lands.
2.

Administrative Law Issues

Another critique will likely come from agency officials and administrative law
experts who can point out that the above discussion largely ignores at least three
administrative law concerns: (1) agency authority over the public lands is limited by
congressional delegations instructing entities such as the Forest Service to manage land
in certain ways; (2) within the bounds of delegations, agencies enjoy a considerable
amount of discretion in choosing among competing claims to the public lands; and (3)
the peoplehood discussion conflates process and substance concerns.
To take the first part of the critique, Congress created the Forest Service within the
Department of Agriculture to manage the nation's timber. 100 Congress did not charge
the Forest Service with effectuating cultural, religious, economic, and other concerns of
subgroups of the American peoples. However, in recognition that priorities change with
the times, Congress passed the National Forest Management Act recognizing competing
demands on the national forests. 101 The Act now provides that
the Forest Service, by virtue of its statutory authority for management of the National
Forest System, research and cooperative programs, and its role as an agency in the

Department of Agriculture, has both a responsibility and an opportunity to be a leader in
assuring that the Nation maintains a natural resource conservation posture that will meet
102
the requirements of our people in perpetuity.
This broad attention to the Nation's people can surely include the varied needs of
subgroups of people beyond timber harvesting.
Myopia: A Reply to ProfessorLaurence's Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations, 30 Ariz. L. Rev. 439, 456-57 (1988); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of FederalIndian Law:
The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 Wis. L. Rev.
219, 291-94.
98. See generally Carpenter, supra n. 10 (advancing a property fights approach to sacred sites cases).
99. See Tsosie, supra n. 3.
100. Forest Service Organic Act of 1897, 16 U.S.C. § 475 (2000).
101. Id. at §§ 1600-1687.
102. Id. at § 1600(6).

2006]

COOPERATIVE MANAGEMENT OF SACRED SITES

The Act contemplates flexibility and responsiveness to changing circumstances in
the management of the Nation's forests. It requires "a comprehensive assessment" of
needs and demands on the forests. 10 3 Moreover, such assessment of the Nation's needs
must occur with "public participation"' 104 and based upon research that promotes
"effective management, use, and protection of the Nation's renewable resources." 105
Taking into account peoplehood concerns at sacred sites will help the Forest
Service meet its statutory mandate to "meet the requirements of our people in
perpetuity."' 106 Other federal land managers such as the National Park Service and
Bureau of Land Management also work under congressional delegations that may be
07
flexible enough to authorize the agencies to consider peoplehood concerns.
The next question is whether these proposals to consider peoplehood interfere with
1 8
agency discretion. Courts grant agencies considerable discretion in policy decisions, 0
such as the Forest Service's decision about whether to allow snowmaking at San
Francisco Peaks. 109 This discretion reflects that agencies are deemed "accountable" to
the public through the executive branch and "expert" in the subject matters where they
exercise authority.' 10 Courts only intervene in such policy matters when agencies act
contrary to congressional intent or in a way that is arbitrary and capricious; needless to
say, perhaps, courts are unlikely to start imposing a peoplehood standard in sacred sites
cases. Rather peoplehood concerns should come up at the agency level and through the
leadership of federal land managers-much in the way that many agencies have
developed specific practices and enhanced awareness of Indian issues, as reflected in
new agency-prepared guidelines and manuals. III Agencies have done so out of a desire
to improve their administration of the public lands and to be more responsive to their
constituents. Deciding to pay attention to peoplehood concerns, as a matter of policy,
could further help agencies meet these goals.
Finally, this essay has admittedly glossed over the question of whether peoplehood
concerns should influence the process or substance of land management issues. The
short answer is that, within the bounds of administrative law as discussed above,
agencies should be attentive to peoplehood at both the process and substance stages.
Specific proposals along these lines-such as how to include peoples in the consultation
103. Id. at § 1600(3).
104. Id.

105. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(4).
106. Id. at § 1600(6).
107. See Carpenter, supra n. 10, at 1118-19 (on the use of tribal custom in fulfilling congressional mandates
for the national parks).
108. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
109. See Navajo Nation, 408 F. Supp. 2d at 875 ("[T]he Court concludes that the Forest Service did not act
unreasonably in rejecting the various alternatives raised by the Plaintiffs during the project's public scoping
process.").
110. Christopher F. Edley, Jr., Administrative Law: Rethinking Judicial Control ofBureaucracy, 48 (Yale U.
Press 1990).
111. These include publications of the Department of Defense, Native American Sacred Sites and the
Department of Defense, https://www.denix.osd.mil/denix/Public/ES-Programs/Conservation/Legacy/Sacred/
toc.html (Vine Deloria, Jr. & Richard W. Stoffie eds., June 1998); Forest Service, Forest Service National
Alaska
Native
Relations,
No.
FS-600,
Resource
Guide
to
American
Indian
and
http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal (Apr. 1997) (publish date Dec. 5, 1997); National Park Service, Director's
Order 71B, http://home.nps.gov/applications/npspolicy/DOrders.cfm (accessed Nov. 12, 2006).
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and notice and comment processes 112 and how substantively to effectuate competing
claims of peoples or prioritize among them-will be considered in a subsequent essay.
3.

Is Peoplehood More Divisive Than Cooperative?

Finally, some readers might argue that recognizing the interests of peoples will
make sacred sites law and policy even more divisive. Indeed, some contemporary
scholars reject the whole notion of peoplehood as a desirable way of organizing society
today. For example, John Lie argues that peoplehood grows out of now anachronistic
and somewhat irrelevant designations of race, ethnicity, and nation. 1 13 Lie recognizes
that individuals continue to long for collective experiences and affiliate themselves in
racial, ethnic, religious, and other groups. 114 However, he deconstructs claims to
peoplehood such as language, religion, and culture as failing to "offer[] a solid basis for
modem peoplehood." 1 5 The only explanation for the persistence of peoples today is
"common consciouness" reflecting the modem preoccupation with "identity
' 116
transmission" over "status distinction."
Lie's descriptive critique boils down to the idea that peoplehood is "absurd" in a
modem era where attempts to classify and categorize individuals according to rigid
identifiers can all be deconstructed. 1 17 As examples, he points out that "the German
language ... extends across much of continental Europe; Christianity is a world religion;
and Western culture or civilization can be found outside of the West." 118 An
individual's identification with a (singular) people obscures overlapping identities and
the mobility of populations. 1 19 Further, Lie argues, peoplehood distinctions perpetuate
normatively undesirable developments. 12 Modem states have constructed peoplehood
classifications for their own purposes, and the ugly underside of building national
identity along racial, ethnic, and religious lines is conflict between groups. 12 1 Incidents
of genocide in the modem era reflect these tensions between national and sub-national
22
identities at their most extreme.1
Despite what Lie sees as the theoretical and empirical weaknesses of peoplehood,
Lie accepts that individuals will continue to identify and associate as peoples. 123 He
hopes, however, that a critical approach to peoplehood will encourage contemporary
peoples to reflect on topics such as "crimes against humanity" and "nonracist
112. Improvements to the consultation processes under the National Environmental Policy Act and the
National Historic Preservation Act are continually being made. See generallyPalmeret al., supra n. 43.
113. Lie, supra n. 64, at 14.
114. Id. at3-10,233-51.
115. Id. at 15.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 42.
118. Lie, supra n. 64, at 41.
119. See id. at 269 ("Modem peoplehood creates a fiction of homogeneity, of holistic essences."), 272
("Particular individuality is bypassed in the name of an abstract collectivity. In denying the full repertoire of
overlapping belongings and the inevitable flux of populations, the world of modem peoplehood weighs like a
nightmare on the minds of the living.").
120. Id. at 164-90 (on discrimination based on gender, race, disability, and other classifications).
121. See id. at 224.
122. Jd. at 191-231.
123. Lie, supra n. 64, at 237, 269-72.
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thought."

12 4

Thus Lie is more of a pragmatic realist than critics like Dendahl who want to
sweep the concerns of peoples under the rug.125 Denying the existence of subnational
peoples and their competing interests in the public lands is not a useful technique for this
particular problem. Trumpeting the First Amendment's protections for individual
religious freedom and the Equal Protection Clause's guarantee that all citizens have
equal access to the public lands does little to meaningfully resolve sacred sites disputes.
Granting the federal government absolute power over sacred sites on the public lands is
similarly unhelpful in this regard. 12 6 Sacred sites disputes continue to arise in ways that
need actual solutions, preferably solutions that take into account not only the rights of
individuals but the interests of groups. The United States has long struggled with the
tension between its liberal principles and its pluralist reality, 1 27 and the sacred sites
context is only one place where frank recognition of the interests of peoples could
facilitate more meaningful approaches to problems.
V.

CONCLUSION

This essay has argued that talking about peoples at sacred sites makes sense for
several reasons: it reflects the way groups actually interact at and around the public
lands; it coincides with a growing body of scholarship recognizing the peoplehood
interests of subnational groups; and it offers a platform for groups to afford legitimacy to
one another in contentious situations. While peoples often conflict on the public lands,
their varying rights and interests, practices, and values all contribute to a rich spectrum
of ideas about how these lands should be used. Using the language of peoplehood to
explicate collective concerns about sacred sites may help groups afford one another
legitimacy and encourage the federal government to facilitate meaningful
accommodations among them. Hopefully, such changes would lay the groundwork for
enhanced cooperation in the management of sacred sites on the public lands.

124.
125.
126.
127.

See id. at 273.
Review Dendahl, supra note 13, and notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453.
See e.g. Riley, supra n. 40.
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